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Early dynamics of transmission and control of COVID-19: 
a mathematical modelling study
Adam J Kucharski, Timothy W Russell, Charlie Diamond, Yang Liu, John Edmunds, Sebastian Funk, Rosalind M Eggo, 
on behalf of the Centre for Mathematical Modelling of Infectious Diseases COVID-19 working group*
Summary
Background An outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has led to 95 333 confirmed 
cases as of March 5, 2020. Understanding the early transmission dynamics of the infection and evaluating the 
effectiveness of control measures is crucial for assessing the potential for sustained transmission to occur in new 
areas. Combining a mathematical model of severe SARS-CoV-2 transmission with four datasets from within and 
outside Wuhan, we estimated how transmission in Wuhan varied between December, 2019, and February, 2020. We 
used these estimates to assess the potential for sustained human-to-human transmission to occur in locations outside 
Wuhan if cases were introduced.
Methods We combined a stochastic transmission model with data on cases of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in 
Wuhan and international cases that originated in Wuhan to estimate how transmission had varied over time during 
January, 2020, and February, 2020. Based on these estimates, we then calculated the probability that newly introduced 
cases might generate outbreaks in other areas. To estimate the early dynamics of transmission in Wuhan, we fitted a 
stochastic transmission dynamic model to multiple publicly available datasets on cases in Wuhan and internationally 
exported cases from Wuhan. The four datasets we fitted to were: daily number of new internationally exported cases 
(or lack thereof), by date of onset, as of Jan 26, 2020; daily number of new cases in Wuhan with no market exposure, 
by date of onset, between Dec 1, 2019, and Jan 1, 2020; daily number of new cases in China, by date of onset, between 
Dec 29, 2019, and Jan 23, 2020; and proportion of infected passengers on evacuation flights between Jan 29, 2020, and 
Feb 4, 2020. We used an additional two datasets for comparison with model outputs: daily number of new exported 
cases from Wuhan (or lack thereof) in countries with high connectivity to Wuhan (ie, top 20 most at-risk countries), 
by date of confirmation, as of Feb 10, 2020; and data on new confirmed cases reported in Wuhan between Jan 16, 2020, 
and Feb 11, 2020.
Findings We estimated that the median daily reproduction number (Rt) in Wuhan declined from 2·35 (95% CI 
1·15–4·77) 1 week before travel restrictions were introduced on Jan 23, 2020, to 1·05 (0·41–2·39) 1 week after. Based 
on our estimates of Rt, assuming SARS-like variation, we calculated that in locations with similar transmission 
potential to Wuhan in early January, once there are at least four independently introduced cases, there is a more than 
50% chance the infection will establish within that population.
Interpretation Our results show that COVID-19 transmission probably declined in Wuhan during late January, 2020, 
coinciding with the introduction of travel control measures. As more cases arrive in international locations with 
similar transmission potential to Wuhan before these control measures, it is likely many chains of transmission will 
fail to establish initially, but might lead to new outbreaks eventually.
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Introduction
As of Feb 13, 2020, an outbreak of coronavirus disease 
2019 (COVID-19) has resulted in 46 997 confirmed cases.1 
The outbreak was first identified in Wuhan, China, in 
December, 2019, with most early cases being reported in 
the city. Most internationally exported cases reported to 
date have history of travel to Wuhan.2 In the early stages 
of a new infectious disease outbreak, it is crucial to 
understand the transmission dynamics of the infection. 
Estimation of changes in transmission over time can 
provide insights into the epidemiological situation3 and 
identify whether outbreak control measures are having a 
measurable effect.4,5 Such analysis can inform predictions 
about potential future growth,6 help estimate risk to 
other countries,7 and guide the design of alternative 
interventions.8
However, there are several challenges to such analyses, 
particularly in real time. There can be a delay to symptom 
appearance resulting from the incubation period and 
delay to confirmation of cases resulting from detection 
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and testing capacity.9 Modelling approaches can account 
for such delays and uncertainty by explicitly incorporating 
delays resulting from the natural history of infection 
and reporting processes.10 Additionally, individual data 
sources might be biased, incomplete, or only capture 
certain aspects of the outbreak dynamics. Evidence 
synthesis approaches, which fit to multiple data sources 
rather than a single dataset (or datapoint) can enable 
more robust estimation of the underlying dynamics of 
transmission from noisy data.11,12 Combining a mathema-
tical model of severe acute respiratory syndrome corona-
virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) transmission with four datasets 
from within and outside Wuhan, we estimated how 
transmission in Wuhan varied between December, 2019, 
and February, 2020. We used these estimates to assess 
the potential for sustained human-to-human trans-
mission to occur in locations outside Wuhan if cases 
were introduced.
Methods
Data sources
To estimate the early dynamics of transmission in 
Wuhan, we fitted a stochastic transmission dynamic 
model13 to multiple publicly available datasets on cases in 
Wuhan and internationally exported cases from Wuhan. 
The four datasets we fitted to were: daily number of new 
internationally exported cases (or lack thereof), by date of 
onset, as of Jan 26, 2020; daily number of new cases in 
Wuhan with no market exposure, by date of onset, 
between Dec 1, 2019, and Jan 1, 2020; daily number of 
new cases in China, by date of onset, between 
Dec 29, 2019, and Jan 23, 2020; and proportion of infected 
passengers on evacuation flights between Jan 29, 2020, 
and Feb 4, 2020 (appendix p 3). We used an additional 
two datasets for comparison with model outputs: daily 
number of new exported cases from Wuhan (or lack 
thereof) in countries with high connectivity to Wuhan 
(ie, top 20 most at-risk countries), by date of confirmation, 
as of Feb 10, 2020; and data on new confirmed cases 
reported in Wuhan between Jan 16, 2020, and Feb 11, 2020 
(appendix p 3).
Procedures
In the model, we divided individuals into four infection 
classes, as follows: susceptible, exposed (but not yet 
infectious), infectious, and removed (ie, isolated, 
recovered, or otherwise no longer infectious; figure 1). 
The model accounted for delays in symptom onset and 
reporting by including compartments to reflect 
transitions between reporting states and disease states. 
The model also incorporated uncertainty in case 
observation, by explicitly modelling a Poisson observed 
process of newly symptomatic cases, reported onsets of 
new cases, reported confirmation of cases, and a 
binomial observation process for infection prevalence 
on evacuation flights (appendix pp 1–3). The incubation 
period was assumed to be Erlang distributed with mean 
5·2 days14 (SD 3·7) and delay from onset to isolation 
was assumed to be Erlang distributed with mean 
2·9 days (2·1).2,15 The delay from onset to reporting 
was assumed to be exponentially distributed with 
mean 6·1 days (2·5).2 Once exposed to infection, a 
proportion of individuals travelled internationally and 
we assumed that the probability of cases being exported 
from Wuhan to a specific other country depended on 
the number of cases in Wuhan, the number of 
outbound travellers (assumed to be 3300 per day before 
travel restrictions were introduced on Jan 23, 2020, and 
zero after), the relative connectivity of different 
countries,16 and the relative probability of reporting a 
case outside Wuhan, to account for differences in 
clinical case definition, detection, and reporting within 
Research in context
Evidence before this study
We searched PubMed, BioRxiv, and MedRxiv for articles 
published in English from inception to Feb 10, 2020, with the 
keywords “2019-nCoV”, “novel coronavirus”, “COVID-19”, 
“SARS-CoV-2” AND “reproduction number”, “R0”, 
“transmission”. We found several estimates of the basic 
reproduction number (R0) of severe acute respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), including average exponential 
growth rate estimates based on inferred or observed cases at a 
specific timepoint and early growth of the outbreak in China. 
However, we identified no estimates of how R0 had changed in 
Wuhan since control measures were introduced in late January 
or estimates that jointly fitted data within Wuhan to 
international exported cases and evacuation flights.
Added value of this study
Our study combines available evidence from multiple data 
sources, reducing the dependency of our estimates on a single 
timepoint or dataset. We estimate how transmission has varied 
over time, identify a decline in the reproduction number in late 
January to almost 1, coinciding with the introduction of large 
scale control measures, and show the potential implications of 
estimated transmission for outbreak risk in new locations.
Implications of all the available evidence
Coronavirus disease 2019 is currently showing sustained 
transmission in China, creating a substantial risk of outbreaks in 
other countries. However, if SARS-CoV-2 has Middle East 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus-like or SARS-CoV-like 
variability in transmission at the individual level, multiple 
introductions might be required before an outbreak takes hold.
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Wuhan and internationally. We considered the 
20 countries outside China most at risk of exported 
cases in the analysis.
We modelled transmission as a geometric random 
walk process, and we used sequential Monte Carlo 
simulation to infer the transmission rate over time, as 
well as the resulting number of cases and the time-
varying basic reproduction number (Rt), defined here as 
the mean number of secondary cases generated by a 
typical infectious individual on each day in a full 
susceptible population. The model had three unknown 
parameters, which we estimated: magnitude of temporal 
variability in trans mission, proportion of cases that 
would eventually be detectable, and relative probability 
of reporting a con firmed case within Wuhan compared 
with an inter nationally exported case that originated in 
Wuhan. We assumed the outbreak started with a single 
infectious case on Nov 22, 2019, and the entire population 
was initially susceptible. Once we had estimated Rt, we 
used a branching process with a negative binomial 
offspring distribution to calculate the probability an 
introduced case would cause a large outbreak. We also 
did a sensitivity analysis on the following three key 
assumptions: we assumed the initial number of cases 
was ten rather than one; we assumed connectivity 
between countries followed WorldPop rather than 
MOBS Lab estimates; and we assumed that cases were 
infectious during the second half of their incubation 
period rather than only being infectious while 
symptomatic. All data and code required to reproduce 
the analysis is available online.
Role of the funding source
The funder of the study had no role in study design, data 
collection, data analysis, data interpretation, or writing of 
the report. The corresponding author had full access to 
all the data in the study and had final responsibility for 
the decision to submit for publication.
Results
We estimated that Rt varied during January, 2020, 
with median values ranging from 1·6 to 2·6 between 
Jan 1, 2020, and the introduction of travel restrictions on 
Jan 23, 2020 (figure 2). We estimated a decline in Rt in 
late January, from 2·35 (95% CI 1·15–4·77) on January 16, 
1 week before the restrictions, to 1·05 (0·41–2·39) on 
January 31.
The model reproduced the observed temporal trend of 
cases within Wuhan and cases exported internationally. 
The model captured the exponential growth in case 
onsets in early January, the rising number of exported 
case onsets between Jan 15, and Jan 23, 2020, and the 
prevalence of infection measured on ten evacuation 
flights from Wuhan to seven countries. We estimated 
that 94·8% (95% CI 93·1–96·1%) of the Wuhan 
population were still susceptible on Jan 31, 2020 
(figure 2). Our results suggested there were around 
ten times more symptomatic cases in Wuhan in late 
January than were reported as confirmed cases (figure 2), 
but the model did not predict the slowdown in cases that 
was observed in early February. The model could also 
reproduce the pattern of confirmed exported cases from 
Wuhan, which was not explicitly used in the model fitting 
(figure 2). We found that confirmed and estimated 
exported cases among the 20 countries most connected 
to China generally corresponded with each other, with 
the USA and Australia as notable outliers, having had 
more confirmed cases reported with a travel history to 
Wuhan than would be expected in the model (figure 2). 
There was evidence that the majority of cases were 
symptomatic. We estimated that 100% (95% CI 51–100) 
of cases would eventually have detectable symptoms, 
implying that most infections that were exported 
internationally from Wuhan in late January were in 
theory eventually detectable. As a sensitivity analysis, we 
repeated the analysis with a large number of initial cases, 
different mobility data, and the assumption that pre-
symptomatic cases could transmit. In these analyses, we 
observed the same result of a decline in Rt from more 
than 2 to almost 1 in the last 2 weeks of January, 2020 
(appendix pp 10–13).
To examine the potential for new outbreaks to 
establish in locations outside Wuhan, we used our 
estimates of the Rt to simulate new outbreaks with 
potential individual-level variation in transmission (ie, 
so called superspreading events).17–19 Such variation 
increases the fragility of transmission chains, making it 
Figure 1: Model structure
The population is divided into the following four classes: susceptible, exposed 
(and not yet symptomatic), infectious (and symptomatic), and removed 
(ie, isolated, recovered, or otherwise non-infectious). A fraction of exposed 
individuals subsequently travel and are eventually detected in their destination 
country.
Susceptible Exposed Infectious 
Wuhan population
Removed 
International travellers from Wuhan
Onset of symptoms Confirmed
Only a fraction 
of cases travel 
internationally 
Exposed Infectious Removed
Onset of symptoms Confirmed
Prevalence
For data and code required to 
reproduce the analysis see 
https://github.com/
adamkucharski/2020-ncov/
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less likely that an outbreak will take hold following a 
single introduction. If transmission is more homo-
geneous, with all infectious individuals generating a 
similar number of secondary cases, it is more likely 
than an outbreak will establish.18 Based on the median 
Rt estimated during January before travel restrictions 
were introduced, we estimated that a single intro-
duction of SARS-CoV-2 with SARS-like or Middle East 
respiratory syndrome (MERS)-like individual-level 
variation in transmission would have a 17% to 25% 
probability of causing a large outbreak (figure 3). 
Assuming SARS-like variation and Wuhan-like trans-
mission, we estimated that once four or more infections 
have been introduced into a new location, there is 
an over 50% chance that an outbreak will occur 
(figure 3).
Figure 2: Dynamics of transmission in Wuhan, fitted up to Feb 11, 2020
The red line marks travel restrictions starting on Jan 23, 2020. For parts (A) to (F) blue lines represent median, light blue shading represents 50% confidence intervals 
of the model estimate, and dark blue shading represents 95% confidence intervals of the model estimate. In all panels, datasets that were fitted to are shown as solid 
points; non-fitted data are shown as empty circles. (A) Estimated Rt over time. The dashed line represents an Rt of 1. (B) Onset dates of confirmed cases in Wuhan and 
China. (C) Reported cases by date of onset (black points) and estimated internationally exported cases from Wuhan by date of onset (blue line). (D) Estimated 
prevalence of infections that did not have detectable symptoms (blue line), and proportion of passengers on evacuation flights that tested positive for severe acute 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (black points; error bars show 95% binomial CIs). (E) New confirmed cases by date in Wuhan (circles, right hand axis) and 
estimated new symptomatic cases (blue line, left hand axis). (F) International exportation events by date of confirmation of case, and expected number of exports in 
the fitted model. (G) Estimated number of internationally exported cases from Wuhan confirmed up to Feb 10, 2020 and observed number in 20 countries with the 
highest connectivity to China. Rt=daily reproduction number.
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Discussion
Combining a mathematical model with multiple datasets, 
we found that the median daily Rt of SARS-CoV-2 
in Wuhan probably varied between 1·6 and 2·6 in 
January, 2020, before travel restrictions were introduced. 
We also estimated that transmission declined by around 
half in the 2 weeks spanning the introduction of 
restrictions.
The estimated fluctuations in Rt were driven by the rise 
and fall in the number of cases, both in Wuhan and 
internationally, as well as prevalence on evacuation 
flights. Such fluctuations could be the result of changes 
in behaviour in the population at risk, or specific 
superspreading events that inflated the average estimate 
of transmission.17–19 We found some evidence of a 
reduction in Rt in the days before the introduction of 
travel restrictions in Wuhan, which might have reflected 
outbreak control efforts or growing awareness of 
SARS-CoV-2 during this period. The uncertainty in our 
estimates for Rt following the decline in early February, 
2020, results from a paucity of data sources to inform 
changes in transmission during this period.
Comparing model predictions with observed confirmed 
cases reported in Wuhan, we found that the model 
predicted at least ten times higher cases than were 
reported in early February, 2020. The model also did not 
predict the more recent slowdown in cases, suggesting 
that transmission might have declined more than our 
model—which did not fit to this case data—estimated 
during early February, 2020. Our estimates for 
international cases in specific countries were broadly 
consistent with the number of subsequently confirmed 
exported cases outside Wuhan. However, there were 
notably more cases exported to France, USA, and 
Australia compared with what our model predicted. This 
could be the result of increased surveillance and detection 
as awareness of SARS-CoV-2 increased in late January, 
which would suggest earlier exported cases might have 
been missed, or could be the result of increased travel 
out of Wuhan immediately before introduction of travel 
restrictions on Jan 23, 2020.
Based our on estimated reproduction number and 
published estimates of individual-level variation in 
transmission for SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV, we found 
that a single case introduced to a new location would not 
necessarily lead to an outbreak. Even if the reproduction 
number is as high as in Wuhan in early January, it could 
take several introductions for an outbreak to establish, 
because high individual-level variation in transmission 
makes new chains of transmission more fragile, and 
hence it becomes less likely that a single infection will 
generate an outbreak. This factor highlights the 
importance of rapid case identification and subsequent 
isolation and other control measures to reduce the 
chance of onward chains of transmission.20
Our analysis highlights the value of combining 
multiple data sources in analysis of COVID-19. For 
example, the rapid growth of confirmed cases globally 
during late January, 2020, with case totals in some 
instances apparently doubling every day or so, would 
have had the effect of inflating Rt estimates to implausibly 
large values if only these recent datapoints were used in 
our analysis. Our results also have implications for 
estimation of transmission dynamics using the number 
of exported cases from a specific area.21 Once extensive 
travel restrictions are introduced, as they were in Wuhan, 
the signal from such data gets substantially weaker. 
If restrictions and subsequent delays in detection of 
cases are not accounted for, this could lead to artificially 
low estimates of Rt or inferred case totals from the 
apparently declining numbers of exported cases. Our 
model estimates benefited from the availability of testing 
data from evacuation flights, which allowed us to 
estimate current prevalence. Having such information 
for other settings, either through widespread testing or 
serological surveillance, will be valuable to reduce 
reliance on case reports alone.
Figure 3: Risk that introduced infections will establish in a new population
(A) Probability that a single case will lead to a large outbreak for different 
assumptions about the extent of homogeneity in individual-level transmission 
(ie, the dispersion parameter k in a negative binomial offspring process). Results 
are shown for the median reproduction number estimated for severe acute 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 in Wuhan between Jan 1, 2020, and 
Jan 23, 2020. (B) Probability that a given number of introductions will result in a 
large outbreak, assuming SARS-like superspreading events can occur. Points 
show the median estimated reproduction number between Jan 1, 2020, and Jan 
23, 2020; bars show 95% quantile of the range of median values of Rt during this 
period. SARS=severe acute respiratory syndrome. MERS=Middle East respiratory 
syndrome. Rt=daily reproduction number.
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There are several other limitations to our analysis. We 
used plausible biological parameters for SARS-CoV-2 
based on current evidence, but these values might be 
refined as more comprehensive data become available. 
However, by fitting to multiple datasets to infer model 
parameters, and conducting sensitivity analyses on key 
areas of uncertainty, we have attempted to make the 
best possible use of the available evidence about 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission dynamics. Furthermore, we 
used publicly available connectivity and risk estimates 
based on international travel data to predict the number 
of cases exported into each country. These estimates 
have shown good correspondence with the distribution 
of exported cases to date,22 and are similar to another 
risk assessment for COVID-19 with different data.23 We 
also assumed that the latent period is equal to the 
incubation period (ie, individuals become infectious 
and symptomatic at the same time) and all infected 
individuals will eventually become symptomatic. 
However, there is evidence that transmission of 
SARS-CoV-2 can occur with few reported symptoms.24 
Therefore, we did a sensitivity analysis in which 
transmission could occur in the second half of the 
incubation period, but this did not change our overall 
conclusions of a decline in Rt from around 2·4 to almost 
1 during the last 2 weeks of January. We also explored 
having a larger initial spillover event and using different 
sources for flight connectivity data, both of which 
produced the same conclusion about the decline in 
transmission. In our analysis of new outbreaks, we also 
used estimates of individual-level variation in 
transmission for SARS and MERS-CoV to illustrate 
potential dynamics. However, it remains unclear what 
the precise extent of such variation is for SARS-CoV-2.17 
If transmission were more homogenous than 
SARS-CoV or MERS-CoV, it would increase the risk of 
outbreaks following introduced cases. As more data 
become available, it will be possible to refine these 
estimates; therefore we have made an online tool so 
that users can explore these risk estimates if new data 
become available (appendix p 4).
Our results show that there was probably substantial 
variation in SARS-CoV-2 transmission over time, and 
suggest a decline in transmission in Wuhan in late 
January, 2020, around the time that control measures 
were introduced. If COVID-19 transmission is established 
outside Wuhan, understanding the effectiveness of 
control measures in different settings will be crucial for 
understanding the dynamics of the outbreak, and the 
likelihood that transmission can eventually be contained 
or effectively mitigated.
Contributors
Data analysis was led by AJK, who programmed the model with help 
from TWR. AJK, SF, and RME planned the inference framework. CD 
provided the data from online sources. The CMMID 2019-nCoV working 
group members contributed to processing, cleaning, and interpretation 
of data, interpreted the study findings, contributed to the manuscript, 
and approved the work for publication. All authors interpreted the 
findings, contributed to writing the manuscript, and approved the final 
version for publication.
Declaration of interests
We declare no competing interests.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Motoi Suzuki for his help in identifying the 
flight evacuation data sources.
References
1 WHO. Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Situation report 24. 
February 13, 2020. Geneva: World Health Organization, 2020.
2 nCoV-2019 Data Working Group. Epidemiological data from the 
nCoV-2019 outbreak: early descriptions from publicly available data. 
2020. http://virological.org/t/epidemiological-data-from-the-ncov-
2019-outbreak-early-descriptions-from-publicly-available-data/337 
(accessed Feb 13, 2020).
3 Camacho A, Kucharski A, Aki-Sawyerr Y, et al. Temporal changes in 
Ebola transmission in Sierra Leone and implications for control 
requirements: a real-time modelling study. PLoS Curr 2015; 7.
4 Funk S, Ciglenecki I, Tiffany A, et al. The impact of control 
strategies and behavioural changes on the elimination of Ebola 
from Lofa County, Liberia. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2017; 
372: 20160302.
5 Riley S, Fraser C, Donnelly CA, et al. Transmission dynamics of the 
etiological agent of SARS in Hong Kong: impact of public health 
interventions. Science 2003; 300: 1961–66.
6 Viboud C, Sun K, Gaffey R, et al. The RAPIDD Ebola forecasting 
challenge: synthesis and lessons learnt. Epidemics 2018; 22: 13–21.
7 Cooper BS, Pitman RJ, Edmunds WJ, Gay NJ. Delaying the 
international spread of pandemic influenza. PLoS Med 2006; 
3: e212.
8 Kucharski AJ, Camacho A, Checchi F, et al. Evaluation of the 
benefits and risks of introducing Ebola community care centers, 
Sierra Leone. Emerg Infect Dis 2015; 21: 393–99.
9 Aylward B, Barboza P, Bawo L, et al. Ebola virus disease in 
West Africa—the first 9 months of the epidemic and forward 
projections. N Engl J Med 2014; 371: 1481–95.
10 Nishiura H, Klinkenberg D, Roberts M, Heesterbeek JAP. Early 
epidemiological assessment of the virulence of emerging infectious 
diseases: a case study of an influenza pandemic. PLoS One 2009; 
4: e6852.
11 Birrell PJ, De Angelis D, Presanis AM. Evidence synthesis for 
stochastic epidemic models. Stat Sci 2018; 33: 34–43.
12 Baguelin M, Flasche S, Camacho A, Demiris N, Miller E, 
Edmunds WJ. Assessing optimal target populations for influenza 
vaccination programmes: an evidence synthesis and modelling 
study. PLoS Med 2013; 10: e1001527.
13 Dureau J, Kalogeropoulos K, Baguelin M. Capturing the 
time-varying drivers of an epidemic using stochastic dynamical 
systems. Biostatistics 2013; 14: 541–55.
14 Li Q, Guan X, Wu P, et al. Early transmission dynamics in Wuhan, 
China, of novel coronavirus–infected pneumonia. N Engl J Med 
2020; published online Jan 29. DOI:10.1056/NEJMoa2001316.
15 Liu T, Hu J, Kang M, et al. Transmission dynamics of 2019 novel 
coronavirus (2019-nCoV). bioRxiv 2020; published online Feb 13. 
DOI:10.1101/2020.01.25.919787.
16 MOBS Lab. Situation report mainland China. https://datastudio.
google.com/u/0/reporting/3ffd36c3-0272-4510-a140-39e288a9f15c 
(accessed Jan 30, 2020).
17 Riou J, Althaus CL. Pattern of early human-to-human transmission 
of Wuhan 2019 novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV), December 2019 to 
January 2020. Euro Surveill 2020; published online Jan 30. 
DOI:10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2020.25.4.2000058.
18 Lloyd-Smith JO, Schreiber SJ, Kopp PE, Getz WM. Superspreading 
and the effect of individual variation on disease emergence. Nature 
2005; 438: 355–59.
19 Kucharski AJ, Althaus CL. The role of superspreading in Middle 
East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) transmission. 
Euro Surveill 2015; 20: 14–18.
20 Hellewell J, Abbott S, Gimma A, Bosse NI, Jarvis C. Feasibility of 
controlling 2019-nCoV outbreaks by isolation of cases and 
contacts. medRxiv 2020; published online Feb 11. DOI:10.1101/202
0.02.08.20021162.
Articles
www.thelancet.com/infection   Published online March 11, 2020    https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(20)30144-4 7
21 Imai N, Dorigatti I, Cori A, et al. Report 2: estimating the potential 
total number of novel coronavirus cases in Wuhan City, China. 
https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/imperial-college/medicine/sph/
ide/gida-fellowships/2019-nCoV-outbreak-report-22-01-2020.pdf 
(accessed Feb 20, 2020).
22 Pullano G, Pinotti F, Valdano E, Boëlle P-Y, Poletto C, Colizza V. 
Novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) early-stage importation risk to 
Europe, January 2020. Euro Surveill 2020; 25: 2000057.
23 Lai S, Bogoch II, Watts A, Khan K, Li Z, Tatem A. Preliminary risk 
analysis of 2019 novel coronavirus spread within and beyond China. 
https://www.worldpop.org/events/china (accessed Jan 30, 2020).
24 Rothe C, Schunk M, Sothmann P, et al. Transmission of 2019-nCoV 
infection from an asymptomatic contact in Germany. N Engl J Med 
2020; published online Jan 30. DOI:10.1056/NEJMc2001468.
